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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the nature and consequences of uncertainty in transport systems. 
Drawing on work from a number of fields, it addresses travellers’ abilities to predict 
variable phenomena, their perception of uncertainty, their attitude to risk and the various 
strategies they might adopt in response to uncertainty. It is argued that despite the 
increased interest in the representation of uncertainty in transport systems, most models 
treat uncertainty as a purely statistical issue and ignore the psychological aspects of 
response to uncertainty. The principle theories and models currently used to predict 
travellers’ response to uncertainty are presented and number of alternative modelling 
approaches are outlined. It is argued that the current generation of predictive models do not 
provide an adequate basis for forecasting response to changes in the degree of uncertainty 
or for predicting the likely effect of providing additional information. A number of 
alternative modelling approaches are identified to deal with travellers’ acquisition of 
information, the definition of their choice set and their choice between the available 
options. The use of heuristic approaches is recommended as an alternative to more 
conventional probabilistic methods. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper is intended to provide an overview of the field rather than to report on new 
research findings. It seeks to provide a background for a discussion of travellers’ responses 
to information from ITS sources and to suggest some approaches to modelling that 
response.  
 
The paper will argue that, although the presence of uncertainty in transport systems is well 
known, most analyses of traveller behaviour treat it rather simplistically and most attempts 
to model it have seen uncertainty as a statistical issue which can be dealt with using fairly 
conventional probability theory rather than as a phenomenon which deserves detailed 
behavioural investigation. A recurring theme of the paper will be that, since it is 
uncertainty in the mind of the traveller, rather than variability in the system, which directly 
influences behaviour, we need to understand people’s perception of and attitudes to 
uncertainty if we are to predict their responses to it.  The study of variability in transport 
systems is an essential input to this process but it is not the end of the matter. 
 
Interest in uncertainty and variability in transport systems is not new but has increased 
dramatically in recent years. We suggest that there are two fundamental reasons for this. 
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Firstly, we suggest that uncertainty has become a more serious problem due to the faster 
pace of life, the prevalence of just-in-time processes in industry and the increased problem 
of congestion – traffic growth has outstripped the available capacity and traffic engineers 
have responded by fine tuning the system leaving it with little spare capacity and so more 
prone to catastrophic failure. Secondly, we suggest that the advent of traveller information 
systems and other ITS developments has drawn attention to the fact that conventional 
models of transport systems and traveller behaviour were unable to fully capture the 
potential benefits of such systems. It was only when we began to try to model the 
implications of providing travellers with additional information that the conventional 
models’ assumption of perfect information became absolutely untenable. If one is to model 
the impacts of ITS one must first address the question of how people behave with 
incomplete information. This naturally leads to an interest in decision making under 
uncertainty.  
 
The paper will set the scene by discussing the nature and consequences of uncertainty 
facing travellers and will then discuss travellers’ abilities to predict variable phenomena, 
their perception of and attitudes to the inevitable uncertainty about the choices available to 
them.  Having outlined a number of strategies by which travellers might respond to 
uncertainty, attention will be turned to various alternative approaches to modelling these 
responses. 
 
The dominant paradigm for the current generation of models is Expected Utility Theory 
(Von Neumann and Morgernstern, 1944). It has many attractions and the resulting model is 
attractively simple but is based on the rather questionable assumption that the decision 
maker is indifferent to risk. People are assumed to evaluate probabilities rationally without 
adding any emotional element which is not already encapsulated in the utilities.  
 
Although transport analysts have done some useful work on response to uncertainty, the 
paper will draw particular attention to the much larger body of work in experimental 
economics and psychology. The paper will outline the principle theories and models 
currently used to predict travellers’ response to uncertainty and will argue that the current 
generation of predictive models based on Expected Utility Theory do not provide an 
adequate basis for forecasting response to changes in the degree of uncertainty or, more 
specifically in the current context, for predicting the likely effect of providing additional 
information.  
 
A number of alternative approaches are identified and although some are fairly complex 
and data-hungry, we will argue that incremental improvements to existing models may 
make it possible to incorporate key aspects of decision making under uncertainty. We will 
suggest a generalised model framework which, with a heuristic implementation, offers 
considerable advantages.   
. 
The paper draws on an earlier version by the author (Bonsall, 2001). It expands on a 
number of the points made in the previous version and, with the addition of new material, 
seeks to provide a more complete treatment of the topic.  
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2. Variability in Transport Systems 
 
2.1 Types of variability 
 
Transport systems are characterised by variability. The most quoted, and most studied, 
examples relate to variability in journey durations but almost all attributes of a journey are 
subject to some degree of variability. The smoothness of the traffic flow, the stressfulness 
of the journey, the chance of being involved in an accident, of getting a parking space, of 
getting a seat on the bus, of successfully hailing a cab, of finding the lights on red, of 
stepping into something unmentionable on the way from the car park, and of finding one’s 
car clamped, vandalised or stolen, are all subject to variation.   
 
Some of the variability in transport systems is due to more or less predictable events such 
as public transport service schedules, planned road maintenance, the daily tide of 
commuter traffic, or the traffic associated with sporting fixtures or public holidays. But 
much of it results from seemingly random events such as road accidents, severe weather, 
technical failure/malfunctioning of equipment, or, most particularly, the behaviour of other 
people – be they fellow travellers, service operators or traffic wardens. Although most 
variabilities are beyond the control of the individual traveller, others, including the risk of 
an accident or breakdown or of getting lost, may be partly or wholly due to the traveller’s 
own actions and, as we shall see, there may be reason to treat them differently in models.  
 
Figure 1 indicates three different patterns of variability. The first might represent the 
probability of a binary event such as whether a given traffic light would be on red or 
whether a given stretch of road is subject to roadworks – the one varying in a matter of 
minutes and the other in months. The second might represent the annual fluctuation in 
lighting-up times or second-by-second variation in noise levels at the roadside. The third 
pattern might represent the distribution of journey durations perhaps varying second by 
second or perhaps over several months. Different patterns will be manifest over different 
timescales and with different degrees of predictability. Very few transport phenomena are 
invariant - although some may be stable for considerable periods of time and others may 
vary so marginally that they can be considered as invariant for all practical purposes.   
 
 
Figure 1: About here  
 
 
 
2.2 The consequences of variability 
 
The consequences of variability are very context-dependent. At one level this is simply a 
matter of cause and effect – as when the consequences of a variation in demand or capacity 
depend crucially on the amount of spare capacity available. At another level, however, it 
reflects the circumstances of the traveller (the purpose of their journey, their ability to 
adjust their plans, their awareness of alternatives, etc) and, most crucially, their ability to 
predict the variation in question.  
 
The consequences of an unexpected delay during a journey would probably be 
insignificant if the time could be made up later in the journey, but could be serious if the 
traveller was already late for an appointment. A late arrival would mean much more to a 
traveller who was due at an important meeting than to someone taking a leisurely drive.  
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 Although some of the consequences of variation might appear to be binary (you are either 
late or on time, you either get a parking space or you do not), their importance will depend 
on the context in which the journey is being made (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2:  About here  
 
 
2.3 The classic model of behavioural response to variable phenomena 
 
Expected Utility Theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) provides a model of 
response to variable phenomena. The theory suggests that behaviour can be explained as 
the result of decision-makers choosing those actions which maximise the expected utility 
(EU) of all the available courses of action. The expected utility of each action will be the 
sum of the utilities of all the potential outcomes of that course of action multiplied by their 
respective probabilities – as summarised in equation 1.  
 
EUa =    ( Uoa . Poa )                          (1) 
                                                     o 
Where  EUa is the expected utility of course of action a    
  Uoa   is the utility of outcome o of action a   
Poa     is the expected probability of outcome o of action a 
 
Figure 3 is a diagrammatic representation of the way in which, in the context of a journey 
of uncertain duration, the probability of different durations is combined with the disutility 
associated with these durations to produce a distribution of expected utility.  
 
 
Figure 3: About here  
 
 
Expected Utility Theory has many attractions and the resulting model is attractively simple 
but it is based on the rather questionable assumption that the decision maker is indifferent 
to risk. People are assumed to evaluate probabilities rationally without adding any 
emotional element which is not already encapsulated in the utilities (an assumption which 
we question in Section 3.4). 
 
Implementation of the model also requires the analyst to know the shape of the probability 
distribution as perceived by the decision maker. If, as we will argue in section 3.3, it is 
unrealistic to assume that the decision maker might know the true probability distribution, 
it becomes necessary to predict what their perceived distribution might look like – the 
apparently simple model now seems rather less simple!  
 
 
 
 
3. Unpredictability in Transport Systems 
 
3.1 Variability and unpredictability 
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 The terms ‘variability’ and ‘unpredictability’ are often used almost interchangeably but, 
although some of their causes and obvious manifestation may be similar, their 
consequences for traveller behaviour are quite different.  
 
When a phenomenon is described as variable the implication is simply that it is subject to 
change. Variability is thus a descriptive label; if something is not constant then it is 
variable and the extent of its variability can, in theory if not in practice, be measured. 
Variability is often associated with uncertainty and unpredictability, in as much as variable 
phenomena are generally more difficult to predict, but there is no reason to assume that 
invariant phenomena can be predicted or that varying phenomena cannot be predicted.  
 
Some phenomena affecting transport choices may be invariant but unknown to many 
travellers. For example, travellers who do not usually use public transport may be quite 
unaware of the fare payable for a particular journey and drivers who do not use a particular 
parking location may be unaware of the charge due. Other phenomena affecting transport 
choices may be variable but habitual travellers may come to recognise patterns in their 
variation. For example, regular travellers on a commuter route may come to recognise that 
the journey time varies within a particular range, that the worst of the congestion can be 
avoided by setting off at a particular time, and that speeds are reduced during adverse 
weather conditions. With reference to Figure 1, it is clear that some patterns are, by their 
very nature, easier to identify than others. If a pattern is detectable, and detected by the 
traveller, then that traveller might be in a position to use the shape of the probability 
distribution to inform his choices (as implied by Expected Utility Theory). If it is not 
detectable or detected then it cannot possibly inform the traveller’ choices.  
 
If a phenomenon is described as unpredictable the implication is that its state at any given 
time cannot be known in advance. Unpredictability is a not simply a statistical concept and 
it may be difficult or impossible to measure. The state of predictability depends on the 
person doing the predicting; something may be regarded as predictable by one person but 
may seem completely unpredictable to another. Predictability is thus, in part, a question of 
perception; if someone regards something as unpredictable then, to him, it is unpredictable 
and he will behave accordingly (and vice versa). 
  
 
3.2 Travellers abilities to predict  the role of experience and information 
 
Travellers base their prediction of future system conditions on various sources of 
information. These include: 
x personal experience; 
x second hand experience and opinion from friends, colleagues, or the media; and 
x information and advice provided by system managers or other agencies. 
 
These sources are interpreted in the light of the traveller’s personal understanding of how 
the system works. Most travellers are aware of general “rules” (such as that travel times 
are longer when the weather is bad or the traffic is heavy), but many are unaware of more 
detailed phenomena affecting the performance of transport systems (such as the extent to 
which traffic signal settings vary from hour to hour and thus affect the likelihood of 
meeting a red signal at different times of day). A traveller’s understanding of how the 
system works is likely to reflect the amount of experience they have of that system and the 
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amount of information at their disposal, but it will also depend on their intellectual 
curiosity/ability. 
 
Personal experience is a powerful source of information (Toglia et al, 1992) but most 
people are quite happy to rely on second hand experience or opinions (Perkins, 1999). For 
example, it is commonly asserted that Bangkok is congested by people who have never 
visited the place! Second hand experience and opinion is particularly powerful if it derives 
from a respected source and is often repeated and, in such circumstances, may even 
outweigh a contrary personal experience (Asch, 1985).  
 
Information and advice provided by system managers and other agencies might involve 
one or more of a number of alternative sources including; maps, timetables, roadside 
information, advice bureaux, TV/radio broadcasts, Internet pages and in-vehicle units. 
Such information can, of course, be of great value to travellers but their ability to make use 
of it is conditioned by their ability to access it, their ability to understand it and their 
preparedness to trust it. Research suggests that the credibility of the information depends 
on the degree to which it is corroborated by other sources of information, its inherent 
reasonableness, and the credibility of the source (see, for example, Bonsall and Parry, 
1991, or Wardman et al 1997). The credibility of the source is likely to depend primarily 
on its track record of providing reliable information but there is some evidence to suggest 
(see, for example, Bonsall and Palmer, 1999) that travellers, suspecting the motives of 
some information providers, may be sceptical of the information or advice they provide 
(the classic example being the suspicion that highway authorities will exaggerate the 
seriousness of potential delays at road works because they want to reduce traffic at such 
sites to a minimum).  
 
An experienced traveller will usually be better able to predict conditions in a transport 
system than will a newcomer because he will have better knowledge of:  
x the established patterns (of congestion, service levels, etc) and of the ways in which 
they differ according to the time of day, day of the week or weather conditions;  
x how to recognise the advance signs of disruption or change; and 
x where to access information about the current state of the system (and how much 
trust to put in the sources of such information). 
 
However, when established patterns are disrupted, the experienced traveller may find that 
his knowledge of those patterns is of little use. For example:  
x if normal timetables are suspended (e.g. during a strike or technical breakdown); 
x if capacities are disrupted by a radical change to the network (e.g. due to the 
closure of major link or during severe weather conditions); 
x if the system has been re-engineered such that it becomes more (or less) vulnerable 
to disruption; 
x if the pattern of demand is disrupted by a major event (e.g. a major sports fixture);  
x if the behaviour of other users of the system changes radically (e.g. due to the 
unprecedented presence of a large number of visitors or if a significant number of 
drivers gain access to a new source of traffic information which causes them to 
alter their behaviour).  
 
If established patterns are no longer valid for reasons such as those indicated above, the 
experienced traveller relying on experience of the “normal” situation may actually be more 
confused than someone without that knowledge. 
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 Although travellers’ ability to predict usually increases as more information is made 
available to them, a lack of information can sometimes give the traveller a false confidence 
in his ability to predict.  For example, an experienced driver may be aware that the 
duration of a particular journey time is very weather-dependent, whereas a less 
experienced driver may assume that he can complete the journey in an hour whatever the 
weather conditions. 
 
Although uncertainty in the mind of the traveller stems from complexity and variability in 
the transport system, it is more directly due to the fact that the traveller believes that some 
aspect of the system is characterised by uncertainty.  Generally this will be because the 
traveller believes that the phenomenon is unpredictable or that he does not have access to 
the information which would enable him to make a confident prediction.  These beliefs 
may or may not be correct, but it is the beliefs, rather than the reality, that will influence 
the traveller’s behaviour – including the decision on whether to seek additional 
information. Some ITS systems, for example advanced traffic control systems, may be 
designed to reduce variability but most are designed to reduce uncertainty in the mind of 
the traveller.  
 
 
3.3 Perceptions of variability 
 
A traveller’s knowledge or experience of the distribution of possible outcomes of any 
given course of action is typically very sparse and unlikely to be representative of the full 
distribution. On this basis alone we would argue that it is thus very unlikely that travellers 
can have an accurate perception of the relative frequencies with which particular outcomes 
might arise. But a further reason is that travellers’ recollection of past events is subjective 
and selective. It is known that people are more likely to recall events which were out of the 
ordinary than those which were unremarkable (Graesser et al, 1980; Woll et al, 1982). 
There is also evidence to suggest that most people tend to recall occasions when things 
went particularly badly more readily than those when things went particularly well (see, 
for example, Robinson-Reigler and Winton, 1996). The traveller is more likely to 
remember the journeys when he missed the train or was late for the meeting than the ones 
when everything worked according to plan. This is bound to result in a distorted perception 
of the distribution of possible outcomes.  
 
A more fundamental question is whether the ordinary traveller’s perception of probabilities 
of different outcomes bears any relationship to the kind of distribution functions used by 
analysts.  
 
Attempts to study travellers’ perceptions of the distribution of probabilities are fraught 
with difficulties because it is impossible to know what their full experience has been and 
any attempt to ask their assistance in logging some part of that experience risks over-
sensitising them to the phenomena. The risk of undue sensitisation is also present in 
laboratory-based experiments. A particular problem confronting research in this area is 
finding a way to characterise uncertainty in ways understood by the traveller unused to 
mathematical representations of probability.  Although Polak and Jones (1993) had some 
success with fairly scientific representations of the distributions, Bonsall and Palmer 
(1998) found that travellers were happier to characterise their experience in terms of 
‘headline’ outcomes (e.g. ‘on a good day’ ‘on a bad day’ and ‘on a normal day’).  
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It seems that many people perceive probability distributions as a small set of discrete 
outcomes each having an associated, all be it fuzzy, chance of fulfilment. This conclusion 
would invite analysis using heuristics or fuzzy logic rather than more conventional 
statistical approaches.   
 
 
3.4 Travellers attitudes to uncertainty and risk   
 
Travellers’ choices among the available options will reflect their perception of the costs 
and benefits associated with each option.  If the costs or benefits are perceived to be 
uncertain then the choice will be influenced by the traveller’s attitude to that uncertainty.  
The key issue is their attitude to risk. Suppose that a traveller is faced with the choice of 
three modes of transport and that the probability distributions for their arrival times at the 
destination are as shown in Figure 4. Which one would the traveller choose? 
        
 
  
Figure 4: About here  
 
 
According to the distributions, mode A is most likely to arrive at T1 but might arrive as 
late as T5. Mode B is most likely to arrive at T2 and is certain to have arrived before T4. 
Mode C is most likely to arrive at T3 but could arrive as early as T0 or as late as T6. 
Assuming that the traveller wants to arrive as soon as possible, he should choose A if he 
wants the mode which is likely to arrive earliest but C if he wants the mode that could 
arrive the earliest. If the traveller wants to avoid being later than T4 he should choose B, If 
he wants to arrive earlier than T5 he could safely choose A or B (but with a preference for 
A since it is likely to arrive earliest). The actual choice will depend not only on the 
consequences of arriving at different times but also on the traveller’s perception of the 
probabilities involved and his attitude to risk. 
 
However, as noted by Edwards (1962), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Schoemaker(1980) 
and many others, it is well established that people do not respond to probabilities in a 
strictly rational manner. For example, most people behave as if they are exaggerating low 
probabilities (vide the popularity of lotteries and the fear of flying) and most people behave 
as if they are unaware of the differences between low probabilities (for example, most 
people would treat odds of 1:1,000,000 and 1:10,000,000 as virtually identical). These 
behaviours may reflect an ignorance of the underlying odds or a misunderstanding of the 
laws of probability but most seem to be associated with personality traits; optimists like to 
gamble – they are risk-seeking, while pessimists do not like risking loss (or failure to win) 
- they are risk-averse.   
 
We referred in Section 2.2 to the fact that the consequences of an unexpected delay during 
a journey would probably be insignificant if the time could be made up later in the journey. 
This may be true in an objective sense but, for someone who is very risk averse, the 
experience of that delay, however inconsequential, might be sufficient to affect their 
behaviour next time they make the journey.  
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Figure 5 shows how attitudes to risk might be represented via marginal utility curves. 
Curve a is the perceived probability of a given event (in this case the probability of a given 
journey duration). Curve b shows how the utility of each journey duration might be 
affected for someone who is risk seeking (the marginal utility is zero for outcomes which 
are no better than the most likely but are increasingly positive for outcomes that are better 
than that). Curve c shows the same thing for someone who is risk averse (the marginal 
utility is zero for outcomes which are no worse than the most likely but is increasingly 
negative for outcomes which are worse than that).  
 
 
    
Figure 5: About here  
 
Figure 6 is equivalent to Figure 3 and shows how an attitude-to-risk surface such as curve 
c in Figure 5, might be combined with the probabilities and outcomes to produce a risk-
weighted expected utility distribution. 
 
 
Figure 6: About here  
 
 
Attitudes to risk vary from person to person, and any given person’s attitude varies 
according to circumstances and their emotional state, but some general tendencies are 
apparent. For example, it is generally held that females are more risk averse than males 
(see for example, Eckel and Grossman, 2002) and it appears that risks are perceived more 
keenly if one does not have control over them – a tendency which causes people travelling 
by train or bus to build more slack time into their schedules than is generally allowed by 
people who are driving (Koskenoja, 1996).  
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that, other things being equal, there will be a 
tendency towards risk-averse behaviour when the outcomes involve gains and towards 
risk-seeking behaviour when the outcomes involve losses. They developed Prospect 
Theory, and more recently, Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) to 
explain some of the commonly observed departures from the behaviour that would result 
from strictly rational assessments of probabilities. The key tenet of Prospect Theory is that 
decisions are context-dependent and that the evaluation of risky prospects involves a 
sequential assessment of outcomes during which process the prospects are disassembled, 
simplified and reassembled with gains and losses being identified in respect of some 
common reference point. Prospect Theory is clearly more difficult to work with than 
Expected Utility theory but would appear to have a much sounder behavioural basis. In 
place of the assumption that people will assess perceived probabilities in a strictly rational 
manner, Prospect Theory allows for a subjective weighting of perceived probabilities 
reflecting the decision maker’s attitude to risk. 
 
Studies in experimental economics emphasise the role of gambling or risk-seeking 
behaviour and there is a very extensive literature on the subject (see, for example, issues of 
the journal Games and Economic Behaviour, the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 
Organisation Behavior and Human Decision Processes, or the Journal of Economic 
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Behavior and Organisation). Application of the methods used in experimental economics 
to the study of driver behaviour are rare but include work by Powell and Davis (1996) and 
Denant-Boemont and Petiot (2003). Although the strategies adopted by participants in 
games of chance constructed by experimental economists may not reflect real-life 
behaviour and any interpretation of that data as evidence of real-life risk seeking is 
therefore bound to be controversial, the behavioural tendencies revealed by such work 
have strong anecdotal echoes. Powell and Davis assumed that interurban route choice 
strategies could be interpreted as “games” played by drivers seeking to outperform the 
expected duration for the journey in question.  Denant-Boemont and Petiot found some 
evidence to suggest that drivers would generally prefer to risk an uncertain journey 
duration rather than pay a toll which would have guaranteed a certain journey duration.  
 
Another interesting example is provided by the work of Cho (1998) who used SP questions 
to examine drivers’ responses to imprecisely defined tolls.  Although the results showed a 
general preference for routes with fixed tolls rather than uncertain tolls, this preference 
seemed to decrease as the degree of uncertainty increased.  It was clear that some 
respondents, particularly males, were showing a distinct preference for the most uncertain 
tolls. Cho sought to explain this result using Prospect Theory but found the theory 
unsatisfactory as an explanation of why a general preference for the certain prospect 
should co-exist with an increasing preference for the increasingly uncertain prospect. 
Bonsall (2000a) sought alternative explanations for the result but eventually concluded 
that, despite the absence of any exaggerated incentive to gamble, some respondents had a 
real preference for the more uncertain prospect simply because it offered greater risk.   
 
 
4.  Travellers’ Strategies for Dealing with Perceived Uncertainty 
 
We will now consider the strategies which travellers might adopt to deal with perceived 
uncertainties. We distinguish five main types of strategy: 
- seeking to reduce the uncertainty by accessing additional information; 
- seeking to reduce the uncertainty by advance planning; 
- seeking to reduce the consequences of the uncertainty;  
- accepting the uncertainty and seeking to make the best decision in the light of it; and  
- seeking to capitalise on the uncertainty.  
 
 
4.1 Reducing uncertainty by accessing additional information 
 
Faced with uncertainty, a wise traveller will put some effort into seeking better information 
before considering whether and how to adjust his behaviour.  The action required will 
depend on the circumstances but the following examples serve to illustrate the point. 
x Experiment with a number of transport alternatives (modes, routes, times of travel) in 
order to assess their relative attractiveness. This strategy is expensive but may be very 
appropriate for people who have recently moved their home or workplace.  
x Invest in up-to-date maps, timetables etc. This action is particularly relevant for 
newcomers to an area or following changes to the transport network of services 
provided. 
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x Subscribe to a traffic information service. This strategy might suit travellers for whom 
schedule-adherence is likely to be an important consideration and for whom access to 
real-time traffic information may therefore be particularly important 
x Seek information or advice from a telephone enquiry line, Teletext service or Internet 
site prior to departure. This is already the norm for many users of long distance public 
transport services and, with the increasing quality of information available, may 
become the norm for more local journeys.  
 
Active information acquisition requires an investment of time and other resources and the 
traveller must consider whether the investment is likely to be justified. The costs and 
benefits of information searches have attracted attention in many fields and a considerable 
literature has resulted.  (See, for example, Richardson, 1978; Gemunden, 1985; Walker and 
Ben Akiva, 1994). The following strategies for information acquisition have been 
identified and are clearly relevant in the context of travellers’ decisions to access ITS 
services : 
x Devote a predetermined amount of resource to the search and then stop (e.g. spend ten 
minutes studying train timetables). 
x Continue seeking extra information until a predetermined goal is met (e.g. until an 
airline offering flights to Japan for less than $1000 is found). A satisficing strategy of 
this kind may, of course, lead to an endless search! 
x Continue as long as there is a reasonable prospect of reward from continuing. This 
strategy appears logical, and allows for decreasing rates of return, but requires a 
reliable method of predicting the likelihood of a successful outcome if the search is 
continued. 
 
 
4.2  Advance planning  in order to reduce uncertainty 
 
Strategies designed to reduce uncertainty are most likely to be adopted by people who 
abhor uncertainty and on journeys for which uncertainty could have serious consequences. 
They might include the following: 
x Making maximum use of existing knowledge (eg by choosing to use modes, routes, or 
times with which the traveller is already familiar or for which information is readily 
available). Route choice studies (e.g. Bonsall et al 1997) have revealed that drivers 
making unfamiliar journeys generally seek to make maximum use of routes with which 
they are already familiar. Other work has suggested that female drivers are less willing 
than males to depart from familiar or signposted routes (Bonsall, 1992; Khattak et al, 
1993; Emmerink et al, 1996) and that drivers’ reluctance to depart from familiar routes 
is greatest when they are under time pressure (Bonsall et al, 2000). 
x Deliberately avoiding modes, routes and times which are known to be subject to 
disruption or instability - even if they might otherwise be more attractive than the 
alternatives (eg avoiding travel by plane in foggy conditions, by road during peak 
periods or too late to be sure of getting a parking space at the destination). 
x Taking sensible advance precautions (eg making sure that the vehicle is properly 
maintained and that, if driving in an unfamiliar area, a route has been planned, the 
relevant maps marked up and the subscription to the traffic information service has been 
paid). 
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An appreciation of these strategies is important when analysing the uptake, impact and 
performance of ITS services but they are rarely included in models or even sought in 
surveys.   
 
 
4.3  Seeking to reduce the consequences of uncertainty 
 
These strategies may be categorised according to whether they involve advance planning 
or whether they represent ad hoc responses to an emerging situation.   
 
Strategies which require advance planning include the following: 
x Building a safety margin into the schedule. This is the classic strategy for reducing the 
potential consequences of unexpected delay.  It was clear from Pells’ (1987) review of 
research and analysis in this area in the late 1980’s that scheduled safety margins were 
widely used and tended to be largest where the uncertainty was greatest or the 
consequences of late arrival were most serious.   
x Deliberate adoption of a lifestyle which minimises participation in time-critical 
activities - for example by accepting employment only if it allows flexitime working, 
by eschewing the use of timetabled transport services and by avoiding commitments to 
fixed appointments. 
 
Strategies which represent responses to adverse conditions already encountered on the 
current journey might include the following: 
x Speeding up or slowing down depending on whether one is behind or ahead of schedule. 
x Changing lane, route or mode if the current one seems likely to continue to under-
perform. 
x Alerting people at the destination to the likelihood of a delayed arrival. The widespread 
adoption of mobile communications makes this strategy very attractive and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this is allowing people to reduce their scheduled safety margins 
but little research has yet been done to verify this. 
x Multi-tasking to make up for lost time. Again, this strategy is facilitated by the 
availability of mobile communications and may require modellers to rethink the 
treatment of travel time as unproductive.  
x Abandoning the journey if conditions are so bad that the original purpose of the journey 
can no longer be met (e.g. if there is now no prospect of catching the plane) or, more 
generally, if the effort and resources likely to be required to complete the journey seem 
likely to outweigh the benefits of doing so. 
  
With the exception of rescheduling of departure time to include a safety margin and, more 
recently, the dynamic adjustment of speed or route, few of these responses are included in 
models or even sought in surveys.  
 
 
 
4.4  Making the best decision in the light of the uncertainty 
 
These strategies require an initial assessment of the situation to determine the likely 
outcomes of each action and then a pragmatic decision on how best to proceed. As will be 
clear from the preceding sections, the initial assessment of likely outcomes is far from 
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straightforward but, once it is complete, the possible courses of action might include the 
following: 
x Choose on the basis of the full probability distribution of outcomes for each option. If 
the choice is based on the relative utilities of the different options then this strategy 
requires maximisation of the expected utility (as per equation 1 earlier in the paper). If 
the choice is based only on journey time, it would imply minimisation of expected 
journey time.  
x Choose on the basis of the most probable outcome for each option. For example, 
decide between alternative modes on the basis of the single most likely journey time 
for each option. 
x Choose on the basis of the most pessimistic outcome for each option. For example, 
decide between alternative routes on the basis of their worst-case journey times.  
x Choose on the basis of the most optimistic outcome for each option. For example, 
choose the route that would be the quickest if there were no delays. 
 
The first of these strategies is the one normally assumed in predictive modelling – despite 
its somewhat unrealistic assumptions about the abilities of individuals to comprehend the 
shape of the distributions of probability and disutility. 
 
 
4.5  Capitalising on the uncertainty 
 
Some people thrive on the uncertainty involved in travelling and seem to get a buzz from 
confronting it. Such people may obtain satisfaction by seeing their journey as a 
competition; the challenge being to use their skills to compete with some imaginary 
opponent  (the clock? the system? the driver of the car who barged into the queue in front 
of them? themselves on the previous day?). For such people, the existence of uncertainty in 
the transport system is a bonus. As was illustrated in Figure 5, risk seekers may experience 
increased utility if they succeed in their game of chance and may not suffer 
correspondingly when they lose. The behaviour of risk seekers is likely to be characterised 
by attempts to gain relative advancement and this is likely to be manifest as frequent lane-
changing, use of circuitous routes, frequent changes of route, making fast-getaways from 
traffic lights, and so on.   
 
These phenomena are widely observed and may be taken simply as examples of aggressive 
behaviour. However, if they reflect an attempt to capitalise on the uncertainty within 
transport systems, they may be influenced by changes in the level of uncertainty 
consequent on changes in the supply of capacity or the provision of ITS facilities and 
services. As such they would need to be considered in any analysis of the full impacts of 
ITS deployment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Approaches to Modelling Decision Making under Uncertainty  
 
5.1 Introduction 
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The preceding sections have established the ubiquity of uncertainty in the transport system 
and the potential complexity of travellers’ response to it. It was noted that a number of the 
potential responses involve processes and actions which are usually ignored in analyses of 
traveller behaviour and that some of the potential responses to uncertainty involve advance 
action by the traveller. We will now explore the implications that this has for modelling of 
traveller behaviour, paying particular attention to the representation of the impact of ITS 
systems.  
 
 
5.2 Models which help define the choice set 
 
5.2.1 Restriction of the choice set 
 
One of the consequences of limited knowledge is that the traveller will be unaware of all 
the options available. In such circumstances the choice would be made from a restricted 
choice set.  Equation 2 is a formal statement of such a model but without specifying the 
nature of the restriction.  
 
j  =  
argmax
  { Uk ,  K }     (2) 
 
            Where:    j    is the chosen option 
   Uk  is the utility of option k 
  C    is the restricted choice set to which k belongs.  
 
The restriction, K , could be binary (with K either belonging or not belonging to the 
set C) or probabilistic (such that the probability of K being included is a function of some 
attribute).  If the restriction is intended to reflect limited knowledge it might be proxied by 
excluding, or setting a high probability of excluding, options which are unlikely to be 
known to the traveller. For example, in the context of route choice, one might omit links 
which are not on signposted routes, or which involve substantial diversion from the 
straight-line route.   
 
Restriction of the choice set may of course be voluntary; one of the responses to 
uncertainty identified in Section 4.1 was that the traveller might deliberately exclude 
options characterised by an unacceptable degree of uncertainty. For example, options 
liable to unpredictable non-trivial variation in journey times might be excluded when 
choosing a mode or route by which to travel to an important appointment.  
 
Tversky’s (1972) elimination-by-aspects (EBA) model provides an example of one 
mechanism by which the choice set might be restricted. The EBA model provides for 
options to be eliminated from further consideration if they fail to meet specified criteria in 
respect of one or more of their attributes. Such a model could provide a direct 
representation of an attitude to risk which implied rejection of any option for which there 
is a significant (to be defined) probability of, for example, arriving later than a given time 
or costing more than a specified amount. The critical values should, of course, be allowed 
to vary between groups or individuals and might be different for different journey 
purposes.  
 
Application of elimination rules, whether EBA or some other, might be followed by use of 
a more conventional optimisation model to choose between any remaining options.   
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 5.2.2 Representing imperfect knowledge 
 
Restriction of the choice set allows for the situation where a traveller is unaware of all the 
options available or decides to consider only some of them but it does not allow for the 
case where the traveller is aware of all the options but misperceives their attributes. A 
number of authors have sought to model the impact of imperfect knowledge on route 
choice by distinguishing between drivers on the basis of their assumed level access to 
information. One approach has been to allow informed drivers to choose options on the 
basis of the best estimate of actual generalised costs while uninformed drivers are assumed 
to make their choices according to some heuristic (e.g. signposted routes, free-flow costs, 
or minimum distance routes – see McDonald et al, 1995). Another approach, which we 
will revisit in section 5.3.1, has been to apply more “error” to the choices of unfamiliar 
drivers. But before considering this approach we should perhaps pay further attention to 
models of learning and information acquisition. 
 
5.2.3 Models of information acquisition  
 
The traveller’s choice set, and his perception of the attributes of options within it, is 
necessarily conditioned by his knowledge of the system. This knowledge will be a result of 
experience gained, other information acquired passively or information obtained following 
a deliberate and active search. 
 
Several models have sought to represent driver perception of network performance as the 
result of experience gained. Such models generally take the form of day-on-day 
simulations wherein conditions, and behaviour, change from one day to the next. A record 
is kept of the conditions experienced by each ‘traveller’ and he is assumed to use his 
accumulated experience to form an expectation of conditions and to behave accordingly. 
Notable examples of this approach include Ben-Akiva et al (1991), Cascetta and Cantarella 
(1991), Hu and Mahmassani (1994), Liu et al (1995), Emmerink et al (1995) and Jha et al 
(1998). Although this approach could be used to build up an assumed perception of the 
distribution of the phenomenon in question (typically the journey time to be expected on a 
particular mode or route), most of these models assume that the synthetic traveller uses his 
accumulated experience to derive a single expected value.  
 
There are a large number of ways in which the synthetic traveller might draw a single 
value from his accumulated experience. For example: 
x the mean value experienced in the last n days (assuming the traveller has a limited 
memory), 
x the modal value experienced (assuming that the traveller is persuaded by “the most 
usual” value), 
x the lowest value experienced ( assuming an optimistic traveller); 
x the highest value experienced ( assuming a pessimistic traveller); 
x an exponentially-smoothed mean of the values experienced (assuming that the 
traveller gives greater weight to his most recent experience), or 
x the result of a Bayesian progression.   
 
The creation and analysis of individual histories of journey times could, of course, be 
extended to cover other journey attributes and might begin to use evidence, such as that 
collected by van der Waerden et al (2003), on the influence of key events and incidents on 
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choice-set composition. However, despite reductions in the computing, the construction of 
personal histories for synthesised travellers remains a relatively expensive approach even 
when limited to journey times and it can clearly be argued (see, for example, Bonsall, 
2000b) that, until we know more about how travellers interpret their experiences, the 
computer budget would be more productively devoted to other aspects of the modelling 
process. 
 
We turn now to the representation of active attempts to acquire information. A number of 
information acquisition strategies were outlined in Section 4.1 and models can be 
constructed for each of these. A satisficing strategy might be simulated via a sequence of 
conditional probabilities or heuristic rules, or the outcome might be derived analytically, 
with the investment to reach that outcome being derived probabilistically. A fixed 
investment search could be modelled by optimising among a constrained set of sources.  A 
rational-investment search might be modelled via utility-maximising procedures. 
 
Polak and Jones (1993) and Hato et al (1999) used logit equations to predict the 
probability that a particular information source will be accessed. They concluded that the 
utility of the information source depended on the service attributes (cost, accuracy, 
accessibility), the individual’s characteristics (age, gender), and the trip characteristics 
(purpose, usual degree of congestion). Walker and Ben Akiva (1994) produced a 
sequential model of the search process and sought to calibrate this via laboratory 
simulation. 
 
A full representation of the information acquisition process would need to include the 
following stages (although some may not be relevant in all circumstances): 
x recognition of the value of obtaining additional information (the information 
deficit), 
x recognition that it is possible to obtain additional information; 
x decision to seek additional information; 
x identification of potential sources of additional information; 
x opinion on the credibility of potential sources of additional information; 
x decision to access potential sources of additional information; 
x degree of success in accessing additional information from those sources; 
x degree of success in understanding  the new information; 
x opinion on the credibility of the new information; 
x synthesis of new information with pre-existing knowledge and beliefs; 
x use of synthesised information to form expectations.  
 
  
5.3 Representation of the disutility of options in the choice set 
 
This section will illustrate a number of approaches to the definition of the utility of each of 
the available options. It is assumed that the choice between options would be made on the 
basis of their relative utilities.  
 
5.3.1 The application of random error terms to the mean cost of each option  
 
A commonly adopted mechanism for allowing for uncertainty in a model is simply to add a 
random error term to the cost (or perceived cost) of the option. The size and distribution of 
this error term would be derived as part of the calibration of the model and could be 
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manipulated to represent different levels of knowledge – with larger error terms 
representing less perfect knowledge. Equation 3 shows the case where the disutility of 
option is made up of its mean cost plus a random error term. Equation 4 shows the case 
where the mean cost is multiplied by the random error term.  Other variants could of 
course be defined.  
Ua  =  :a +  İ                             (3) 
 
Ua  =  İ:a                             (4) 
 
 Where:  
Ua     is the disutility of alternative a (as used in a utility maximising model)  
:a     is the mean cost of alternative a 
İ      is a randomly distributed error term 
 
Equations 3 and 4 reflect the usual approach whereby one error term is applied to the entire 
cost but, since this implies the same degree of uncertainty about all components of the cost, 
a case is sometimes made for applying separate error terms to the different components (as 
per equation 5). This would allow separate weighting of uncertainty in, say, travel time and 
out-of-pocket costs. 
 
Ua  = Dn    (Ɋan  +  İnɊan)                         (5) 
 n 
Where: 
Dn      is the weight applied to the nth component of the cost of alternative a   
Ɋan  is the mean cost of the nth component of the cost of an alternative a 
 İ is a randomly distributed error term applied to the nth component of  n     
      the cost of alternative a 
 
Although the use of randomly distributed error terms has some attractions as a way of 
representing uncertainty, it is perhaps more appropriate for representing uncertainty in the 
model (i.e. error, miss-measurement or miss-specification by the analyst) than uncertainty 
in the mind of the traveller because it cannot hope to capture any of the complexity or 
subtlety of traveller attitudes or response. Constraints on the error term might allow for a 
crude representation of risk aversion (e.g. if it were constrained to be positive in equation 
3, or greater than 1 in equations 4 or 5, it would introduce a positive relationship between 
uncertainty and disutility) but this would fall far short of what is required.  
 
 
5.3.2 Methods based on the mode of the cost distribution 
 
Equations 3, 4 and 5 made use of the mean value of the cost distribution. This may be an 
intuitively attractive approach since it makes use of the whole distribution but it lacks 
credibility as a behavioural model because it presupposes that the decision makers would 
or could know what the mean value is. It might be more realistic to assume that they are 
aware of the most frequently experienced value and so an alternative approach might be to 
allow the utility to be based on the modal (most likely) value of the cost distribution – as 
shown in equation 6.  
 
     u
 a   =  sup.( a  ) +  İ       (6) 
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Where: sup.( a  ) is the most likely (i.e. modal) value of the cost of alternative a 
 
 
An alternative, and more behaviourally valid approach might be to base the choice on the 
cost which is perceived to be the most likely as in equation 7. 
 
ua   =  sup.p.( a  ) +  İ      (7) 
 
Where: sup.p.( a  ) is perceived to be the most likely (i.e. modal) value of the 
             cost of alternative a 
 
Variants on equations 6 and 7 could of course be specified with multiplicative error terms 
or with separate treatment of different components of cost (i.e. as per equations 4 and 5) 
but the representation of attitudes to risk would still be quite limited.   
 
 
5.3.3 Methods which make use of statistical measures of variability in the cost 
distribution  
 
An obvious method of representing uncertainties in decision models is simply to add a 
term to the calculated utility to represent the statistical uncertainty associated with a given 
alternative. This approach could be applied using the true, objectively measured, cost 
distribution or some subjective representation - if such were available. Equation 8 shows 
the use of the mean together with the variance but other measures could of course be used.   
 
Ua  =   :a    + ȕ S:a            (8) 
 
Where: S:a  is the variance of  the distribution of cost of alternative a 
           ȕ       is the weight put on the uncertainty inherent in the cost of an alternative 
 
Equation 9 indicates how this method might be extended to allow the uncertainty 
associated with individual components of the generalised cost of an alternative.  
 
Ua  =    Dn  Za n   +   En  SZa n     (9)               
       n 
Where: Dn     is the weight put on the mean value of the nth component of cost 
                   
 
of an alternative 
                    
En   is the weight put on the uncertainty inherent in the value of the nth 
                    component of cost
 
 of an alternative 
(if XP  is journey time, then Dn  will be the value of journey time and En  will be 
 the value of uncertainty in journey time)  
 
 
Variants of this model have been widely used (see for example, Hendrickson and Kocur, 
1981; Small, 1982, Arnott et al, 1990; and Noland and Small, 1995) although most 
applications have excluded all components of generalised cost other than journey time (i.e. 
they only have one  DX a + E SXa   term in equation 9). The main attraction of this model has 
been its simplicity and the ease with which it can be used to explore the impacts of 
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different levels of uncertainty (by redefining SXn ) and different attitudes to it (by varying 
Dn and En  ) within the population of travellers.  
 
Emmerink et al (1998) developed a model based on a stochastic variant of equation 9 
wherein individual traveller’s values of D and E are allowed to vary. The model was used 
to explore the effect of providing traffic information to some or all the drivers in a network 
(an effect represented in the model by reducing the SX term for those drivers receiving the 
information). The authors applied what they regarded as ‘reasonable’ limits to the value of 
E; they deemed that E should lie above zero on the grounds that travellers would not be 
“risk-loving” in respect of journey time and that it should be less than D because “it is 
unlikely that travellers would be so risk-averse” (they relaxed this latter constraint in later 
work but continued to assert that such extreme risk aversion would be confined to 
minorities).  The work on attitudes to risk outlined in Section 3.4 of this paper gives reason 
to believe both constraints should be set aside for some groups within a population. 
 
The model outlined in equation 9 has great attractions as a practical exploratory tool but its 
representation of the distribution of uncertainty via a single measure of dispersion is 
obviously fairly simplistic and makes it difficult to explore, for example,  more complex 
attitudes to risk and uncertainty.  
 
 
5.3.4 Expected utility approaches 
 
The classic expected utility approach, introduced in equation 1, seeks to combine the 
probability distribution with the utility distribution but ignores the question of the decision 
maker’s attitude to uncertainty or his perception of it. Polak (1987) sought to go further by 
combining the attitude to risk with the utility distribution itself. This approach is 
computationally tractable for easily parameterised distributions and it may be 
pragmatically justified if questionnaire respondents are unable to distinguish between 
utility and risk. However, if one wishes to allow more complex distributions, to use 
measurable utilities, or to explore the transferability of attitudes to risk between different 
contexts, this combined approach will not suffice.  
 
 
5.3.5 A  general model of utility  
 
Equation 10 may offer a way forward. It shows how the approach summarised in equation 
9 might be generalised to allow for a more complete representation of the perceived 
distribution of probabilities. For each component of cost it represents the perceived 
distribution of possible outcomes as a number of discrete elements each of which is 
deemed to have been estimated by the traveller with a given level of confidence.  Separate 
weights are applied to the value of each element and to the confidence which the traveller 
places on his estimate of that element.  
 
   Ua  =     Den Xaen   +  ȕen aen   (10) 
      e      n  
 Where: Xaen  is the value of the eth element of the of the perceived distribution 
                                       of the value of the nth component of the cost of alternative a 
aen is the confidence placed on the value of Xaen  
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    Den    is the weight put on the eth element of the perceived distribution 
                                       of the value of the nth component of the cost of an alternative.  
    ȕen       is the weight put on the confidence placed on the value of Xaen  
 
 
By splitting the distribution into discrete elements (e) it becomes possible to allow for 
discontinuous (“lumpy”) perceptions of probabilities by travellers. For example, although 
the cost distribution might be represented as a large number of small increments, it might 
more realistically be represented via a small number of “headline” measures such as the 
mean, mode, median, maximum and minimum.  
 
By allowing different attitudinal weights to be applied to each of these elements of the 
distribution it is possible to allow the decision maker to put more emphasis on, say, his 
estimate of the 75th percentile of a travel time distribution than of, say, its mean.  
 
By including the traveller’s confidence in his estimation of each of the specified cost 
element values, the method allows account to be taken of the perceived uncertainty of the 
various elements of the cost distribution and, since different weights can be put on the 
confidence associated with each element, it is possible to allow the decision maker to put 
more emphasis on, say, his confidence in the mode of a travel time distribution than in, 
say, its median.  
 
By differentiating between the different components of cost (n) it becomes possible to put 
more weight on, say, the mean than the mode when considering out-of-pocket-costs but 
more weight on the mode than the mean when considering journey times. 
 
The Den and  ȕen  coefficients represent the traveller’s attitude to risk for a given attribute  
n. Different sets of coefficients might be sought for different types of people or for 
different journey contexts. However, it is possible that attitudes to risk are transferable 
between attributes, person types and contexts and, indeed, one of the benefits of this 
formulation is that it allows the analyst to see if there is any transferability between a given 
respondent’s apparent attitude to risk while travelling and his attitude to risk in other 
contexts.  
 
The introduction of additional information, such as that coming from a new traffic advice 
service, could be represented within equation 10 in various ways; perhaps by changing the 
expected value of a key cost element, perhaps by increasing the confidence associated with 
that element or perhaps by applying a revised set of weights deemed to reflect the different 
weighting put on values derived from information received from a traffic advice service. 
 
Although, in its full specification, this definition of utility would require an impractical 
amount of data, its value lies in the fact that, it can be simplified as far as is necessary to 
match the available data.  For example, if journey time were found to be the only attribute 
of interest and if the cost distribution were found to represented quite adequately by its 
mode, the utility could be calculated from only two items of data - the most likely journey 
time and the perceived likelihood of this time occurring – with a generic coefficient for 
each. A utility maximisation model using such a simplified specification of utility could 
perhaps be replaced by a simple heuristic (for example, “Select, from among those options 
whose most likely journeys times are likely to occur with a probability of at least 0.5, the option with 
the shortest expected journey time”).  
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 Such heuristics not only require less data, but they actually accord quite closely with 
human decision making processes. Decision makers must use heuristics when faced with 
data which is too complex or uncertain for them to process analytically (see Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). The representation of decision making processes via statistical models 
should be seen as a means of aggregation over different heuristics rather than as an attempt 
to replicate actual decision making. The argument against using simplified statistical 
models is twofold; firstly, because concentration on the aggregate picture may make it 
difficult to understand the process of decision making and so leave the analyst ill-placed to 
predict the effect of changes in base conditions and secondly because use of a statistical 
model may obscure important non-linearities and other irregularities which are actually 
present at the aggregate level. 
 
Recent years have seen several attempts, in transport modelling as much as elsewhere, to 
identify and represent the heuristics used by individual decision makers – with particular 
interest in the extent to which people use fuzzy, rather than precise, definitions (see, for 
example, Lotan and Koutsopoulos, 1993, Henn, 2000). The use of heuristic models and 
fuzzy logic to explore traveller response to uncertainty has obvious attractions and the 
general model of utility presented in equation 10 might offer a framework for such work. 
  
 
6. Concluding Comments  
 
We have argued that uncertainty is the norm in transport systems, that its consequences are 
complex and situation-dependent, and that it cannot be ignored if we want to understand 
traveller behaviour – particularly in the context of the introduction of ITS. We have 
suggested that travellers’ perceptions of probabilities are necessarily incomplete and 
imperfect and that attitudes to risk vary from person to person and from situation to 
situation. We have emphasised that it is the uncertainty that exists in the mind of the 
traveller, together with their attitude to that uncertainty, which determine behaviour.  We 
have noted that the response strategy adopted by a given individual may have more to do 
with their personality type than with a rational assessment of the situation.   
 
We have outlined a number of strategies that travellers might adopt in response to 
perceived uncertainty and have suggested that different strategies might be used by 
different people or even by the same person in different situations. Many of the potential 
responses to uncertainty in the transport system relate to actions which have not usually 
been included in analyses of traveller behaviour and many of them imply actions, or even 
lifestyle decisions, in advance of a given journey.  
 
Although much remains to be discovered about the psychology of response to uncertainty, 
a great deal is already known and the main gap is not so much in the understanding of the 
behavioural factors but in our ability to model them. The key question is, given the 
complexity of the problem and the difficulties involved in obtaining the necessary data, at 
what level of detail is it appropriate to model?  
 
Our review of modelling approaches has indicated a number of some ways in which 
elements of the behavioural response to uncertainty might be modelled. We have suggested 
that, by using a model framework that allows a traveller’s attitudes to risk to be separated 
from his perception of probability and his attitude to outcomes, it may become possible to 
identify transferable patterns in attitudes to risk. If such patterns can be found they would 
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advance our understanding of traveller behaviour and be of great help in the specification 
and calibration of predictive models. 
 
We have suggested that some of the conventional methods, particularly the classic 
expected utility model, are rather limiting but that the use of heuristics and fuzzy logic may 
open the way to more behaviourally-valid approaches.  
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Figure 1: Patterns of Variability 
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seriousness 
      
     journey to airport 
        to catch a flight    
           
 
           
         
        
    
     journey home after the office party 
           
                                                            Length of delay  
Notes: 
In the case of the journey to an airport, the seriousness of the delay increases at first 
gradually (reflecting extra travel time and fuel consumption and reduced time to relax in the 
departure lounge), then increases in steps (as the passenger progressively misses the 
chance to reserve a window seat, to buy duty-free goods and, eventually is too late to 
board). 
In the case of the journey home after the office party, the seriousness of the delay 
increases gradually at first then jumps when it is clear that partner will have gone to bed, 
rises gently as driver gets tireder, then decreases as breakfast bars begin to open! 
 
Figure 2:  Seriousness of the consequences of an unexpected delay 
                 (illustrative – from Bonsall, 2001) 
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Figure 3: Combination of probability and utility to produce expected  
utility 
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Figure 4: Choice between modes with differing probability distributions 
(illustrative) 
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Figure 5: Graphical representation of different attitudes to risk  
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a = perceived probability  
b =  disutility 
c = attitude to risk (risk averse) - note that, since we are dealing with 
disutilities rather than utilities, the curve is the reverse of that 
shown in Figure 5,  
d =  expected disutility 
 
Figure 6: Expected disutility as a function of probability, disutility and 
attitude-to-risk 
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